| name | security-bun |
| description | Bun runtime security audit patterns. Load when reviewing Bun apps (bun.lockb, bunfig.toml, or bun:* imports present). Covers Bun shell injection, bun:sqlite SQL injection, Bun.serve, Bun.spawn, file operations, and Bun-specific footguns. |
Security audit patterns for Bun runtime applications covering shell injection, SQL injection, server security, and Bun-specific vulnerabilities.
The #1 Bun Footgun: Shell Escaping vs Raw Shell
Bun's shell $ is a tagged template that escapes by default. If you bypass escaping (via raw mode), user input can become command injection.
import { $ } from "bun";
const userInput = "hello; rm -rf /";
// ✓ SAFE: Tagged template - automatically escapes
await $`echo ${userInput}`;
// Executes: echo 'hello; rm -rf /'
// ❌ CRITICAL: Spawning a new shell (bypasses Bun escaping)
await $`bash -c "echo ${userInput}"`;
// The nested shell interprets user input as code
Argument Injection (Even with Escaping)
Even the safe tagged template is vulnerable to argument injection:
import { $ } from "bun";
// ❌ HIGH: Argument injection via -- prefix
const userRepo = "--upload-pack=id>/tmp/pwned";
await $`git ls-remote ${userRepo} main`;
// The -- prefix makes it a command-line argument, not a value
// ✓ Validate input format before use
const userRepo = getUserInput();
if (!userRepo.match(/^https?:\/\//)) {
throw new Error("Invalid repository URL");
}
await $`git ls-remote ${userRepo} main`;
// ✓ Or use -- to end argument parsing
await $`git ls-remote -- ${userRepo} main`;
bun:sqlite SQL Injection
sql is a tagged template that parameterizes values. If you build SQL strings manually, you can still be vulnerable.
import { sql } from "bun";
const userId = "1 OR 1=1";
// ❌ CRITICAL: Function call - SQL injection!
await sql(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`);
// Executes: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = 1 OR 1=1
// ✓ SAFE: Tagged template - parameterized query
await sql`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`;
// Executes: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1 with params ['1 OR 1=1']
bun:sqlite Database Class
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
const db = new Database("mydb.sqlite");
const userInput = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";
// ❌ CRITICAL: String interpolation
db.run(`INSERT INTO logs VALUES ('${userInput}')`);
// ✓ SAFE: Parameterized with .run()
db.run("INSERT INTO logs VALUES (?)", [userInput]);
// ✓ SAFE: Prepared statements
const stmt = db.prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?");
stmt.get(userInput);
// ✓ SAFE: Query with parameters
db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?").get(userInput);
Bun.serve() Security
Missing Request Validation
// ❌ No input validation
Bun.serve({
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
const file = url.searchParams.get("file");
return new Response(Bun.file(`./uploads/${file}`)); // Path traversal!
},
});
// ✓ Validate and sanitize
import { join, basename, resolve } from "path";
Bun.serve({
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
const file = url.searchParams.get("file");
// Sanitize filename
const safeName = basename(file ?? "");
const uploadsDir = resolve("./uploads");
const filePath = resolve(join(uploadsDir, safeName));
// Verify path is within uploads directory
if (!filePath.startsWith(uploadsDir)) {
return new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
}
return new Response(Bun.file(filePath));
},
});
Request Size Limits (DoS Protection)
// ❌ No body size limit (large uploads can exhaust memory)
Bun.serve({
fetch(req) {
return new Response("ok");
},
});
// ✓ Set a max request body size
Bun.serve({
maxRequestBodySize: 1_000_000, // 1 MB
fetch(req) {
return new Response("ok");
},
});
CORS Configuration
// ❌ Wide open CORS
Bun.serve({
fetch(req) {
return new Response("data", {
headers: {
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials": "true", // Dangerous combo!
},
});
},
});
// ✓ Explicit origin allowlist
const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = ["https://app.example.com"];
Bun.serve({
fetch(req) {
const origin = req.headers.get("Origin");
const corsHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
corsHeaders["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = origin;
corsHeaders["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true";
}
return new Response("data", { headers: corsHeaders });
},
});
Host Binding
// ❌ Exposed to network (sometimes unintentional)
Bun.serve({
hostname: "0.0.0.0", // Accessible from any network interface
port: 3000,
fetch(req) { /* ... */ },
});
// ✓ Localhost only for development
Bun.serve({
hostname: "127.0.0.1", // Only local access
port: 3000,
fetch(req) { /* ... */ },
});
Bun.spawn() Command Injection
// ❌ CRITICAL: User input in command array (can still be dangerous)
const filename = userInput; // Could be "--version" or other flags
Bun.spawn(["convert", filename, "output.png"]);
// ❌ CRITICAL: Shell execution with user input
Bun.spawn(["sh", "-c", `convert ${userInput} output.png`]);
// ✓ Validate input first
const filename = userInput;
if (!filename.match(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.(jpg|png|gif)$/)) {
throw new Error("Invalid filename");
}
Bun.spawn(["convert", filename, "output.png"]);
// ✓ Use -- to prevent flag injection
Bun.spawn(["convert", "--", filename, "output.png"]);
Bun.file() and Bun.write() Path Traversal
// ❌ HIGH: Path traversal
const userFile = req.query.file; // "../../etc/passwd"
const content = await Bun.file(`./uploads/${userFile}`).text();
// ❌ HIGH: Writing to arbitrary paths
await Bun.write(`./data/${userFile}`, content);
// ✓ Sanitize paths
import { join, basename, resolve } from "path";
const UPLOADS_DIR = resolve("./uploads");
function getSafePath(userInput: string): string {
const safeName = basename(userInput);
const fullPath = resolve(join(UPLOADS_DIR, safeName));
if (!fullPath.startsWith(UPLOADS_DIR)) {
throw new Error("Invalid path");
}
return fullPath;
}
const content = await Bun.file(getSafePath(userFile)).text();
Bun.password (Secure, but check usage)
// ✓ Bun.password.hash is secure by default (uses argon2)
const hash = await Bun.password.hash(password);
// ✓ Verify passwords
const isValid = await Bun.password.verify(password, hash);
// ⚠️ But check: is it actually being used?
// Common vibecoding mistake: storing plaintext anyway
// ❌ Storing plaintext
db.run("INSERT INTO users (password) VALUES (?)", [password]);
// ✓ Storing hash
const hash = await Bun.password.hash(password);
db.run("INSERT INTO users (password_hash) VALUES (?)", [hash]);
Environment Variables
// Bun.env is the same as process.env
// ❌ Secrets in client-facing code
// If using Bun with a bundler, check what gets bundled
// ✓ Server-only access
const apiKey = Bun.env.API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
throw new Error("API_KEY not configured");
}
// Check bunfig.toml for any exposed variables
bunfig.toml Security
# Check for suspicious configurations
[install]
# ❌ Disabling lockfile = supply chain risk
save-lockfile = false
# ❌ Allowing arbitrary registries
registry = "http://malicious-registry.com"
[run]
# ❌ Disabling sandbox (if applicable)
WebSocket Security
Bun.serve({
fetch(req, server) {
if (req.headers.get("upgrade") === "websocket") {
// ❌ No auth check before upgrade
server.upgrade(req);
return;
}
},
websocket: {
message(ws, message) {
// ❌ Broadcasting without auth
ws.publish("chat", message);
},
},
});
// ✓ Authenticate before upgrade
Bun.serve({
fetch(req, server) {
if (req.headers.get("upgrade") === "websocket") {
const token = req.headers.get("Authorization");
const user = await verifyToken(token);
if (!user) {
return new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
}
server.upgrade(req, { data: { user } });
return;
}
},
websocket: {
message(ws, message) {
// Access authenticated user
const user = ws.data.user;
// Now safe to process message
},
},
});
Common Vulnerabilities Summary
| Issue | Pattern to Find | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Shell injection (function call) | $(...) or $("...") |
CRITICAL |
| SQL injection (function call) | sql(...) |
CRITICAL |
| SQL string interpolation | `...${var}...` in SQL |
CRITICAL |
| Argument injection | User input starting with - |
HIGH |
| Path traversal | Bun.file(userInput) |
HIGH |
| Command injection | Bun.spawn with user input |
HIGH |
| Open CORS | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * |
MEDIUM |
| Network exposure | hostname: "0.0.0.0" |
MEDIUM |
| Missing WebSocket auth | server.upgrade without auth check |
HIGH |
Quick Audit Commands
# Find dangerous shell usage (function call instead of tagged template)
rg '\$\s*\(' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find SQL function calls (should be tagged template)
rg 'sql\s*\(' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find string interpolation in queries
rg '(query|run|exec)\s*\(\s*`' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find Bun.spawn usage
rg 'Bun\.spawn' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js" -A 2
# Find Bun.file with variables (potential path traversal)
rg 'Bun\.file\s*\([^"'\''`]' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find hostname binding
rg 'hostname.*0\.0\.0\.0' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find CORS headers
rg 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"
# Find WebSocket upgrades
rg 'server\.upgrade' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js" -B 5
Hardening Checklist
- All
$shell usage is tagged template (no parentheses) - All
sqlusage is tagged template (no parentheses) - All bun:sqlite queries use parameterization
- User input validated before shell/spawn commands
-
--used to prevent argument injection where applicable - File paths sanitized with basename() and path validation
- CORS restricted to specific origins
- hostname is 127.0.0.1 for dev, explicit for prod
- WebSocket connections authenticated before upgrade
- Bun.password.hash used for passwords (not plaintext)
- bunfig.toml reviewed for suspicious settings