| name | epistemology |
| description | Master epistemology - the theory of knowledge, justification, and belief. Use for: knowledge, justification, skepticism, sources of knowledge, epistemic virtue. Triggers: 'knowledge', 'epistemology', 'justification', 'belief', 'Gettier', 'skepticism', 'certainty', 'evidence', 'testimony', 'perception', 'reason', 'a priori', 'empirical', 'reliability', 'internalism', 'externalism', 'foundationalism', 'coherentism'. |
Epistemology Skill
Master the theory of knowledge: What is knowledge? How is belief justified? Can we know anything?
Core Questions
| Question | Issue | Stakes |
|---|---|---|
| What is knowledge? | Analysis | Definition of knowledge |
| What justifies belief? | Justification | Epistemic norms |
| Can we know anything? | Skepticism | Scope of knowledge |
| What are sources of knowledge? | Sources | Perception, reason, testimony |
The Analysis of Knowledge
Traditional Analysis
JTB: Knowledge = Justified True Belief
S knows that P iff:
1. S believes that P (belief condition)
2. P is true (truth condition)
3. S is justified in believing P (justification condition)
Gettier Problem
Gettier Cases show JTB is not sufficient:
GETTIER CASE #1
═══════════════
Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get the job
(told by company president).
Smith also knows Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
Smith infers: "The man who will get the job has 10 coins
in his pocket."
Unknown to Smith: HE (Smith) will get the job.
And Smith happens to have 10 coins in his pocket.
Smith's belief is:
✓ Justified (by evidence about Jones)
✓ True (Smith will get job, has 10 coins)
✗ NOT knowledge (too lucky!)
Post-Gettier Theories
Fourth Condition Approaches:
- No false lemmas
- Causal connection
- Defeasibility (no truths that would defeat justification)
Tracking (Nozick):
- S knows P iff: If P were false, S wouldn't believe P
- Sensitivity condition
Safety (Sosa, Pritchard):
- S knows P iff: S couldn't easily have been wrong
- In nearby possible worlds where S believes P, P is true
Virtue Epistemology:
- Knowledge = true belief from intellectual virtue
- Success attributable to cognitive ability
Theories of Justification
Foundationalism
FOUNDATIONALIST STRUCTURE
═════════════════════════
DERIVED BELIEFS
├── Justified by inference
├── From more basic beliefs
└── Not self-justifying
↑
│
BASIC BELIEFS
├── Self-justifying
├── Need no support from other beliefs
└── Foundation of knowledge
Basic Beliefs:
- Classical: self-evident, incorrigible
- Modest: defeasibly justified without inference
Coherentism
COHERENTIST STRUCTURE
═════════════════════
┌─────────────────────┐
│ │
┌───▼───┐ ┌─────┴───┐
│ Belief ├──────────►│ Belief │
│ A │◄──────────┤ B │
└───┬────┘ └────┬───┘
│ │
│ ┌─────────┐ │
└────► Belief ◄──────┘
│ C │
└────────┘
No foundations; mutual support
Objection: Coherent fiction could be well-justified but false (isolation problem)
Infinitism
- No basic beliefs
- No circular justification
- Infinite regress is not vicious
- We can always provide further reasons
Internalism vs. Externalism
| Internalism | Externalism |
|---|---|
| Justifiers must be accessible to subject | Justifiers may be external |
| What I can know by reflection | Reliable processes suffice |
| Epistemic responsibility | Connection to truth matters |
| Examples: evidentialism | Examples: reliabilism |
Skepticism
Cartesian Skepticism
SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
══════════════════
1. I cannot know I'm not a brain in a vat (BIV)
2. If I know I have hands, I can deduce I'm not a BIV
3. If I can't know the conclusion, I can't know the premise
4. Therefore, I don't know I have hands
CLOSURE PRINCIPLE:
If S knows P, and S knows P→Q, then S can know Q
Responses to Skepticism
Moorean Shift:
- I know I have hands
- If I have hands, I'm not a BIV
- Therefore, I know I'm not a BIV
- Common sense trumps skeptical premises
Contextualism:
- "Know" has different standards in different contexts
- In everyday contexts, we do know
- In philosophical contexts, standards are higher
- Both claims are true (in their contexts)
Relevant Alternatives:
- Knowledge requires ruling out relevant alternatives
- BIV is not a relevant alternative in normal contexts
Sources of Knowledge
Perception
Direct Realism: We perceive external objects directly Indirect Realism: We perceive sense-data caused by objects Idealism: Objects are mind-dependent
Problems:
- Perceptual error, illusion
- Skepticism about external world
- Theory-ladenness of observation
Reason (A Priori Knowledge)
Rationalism: Some knowledge is innate or a priori Examples: Mathematics, logic, conceptual truths
Problems:
- How do we access a priori truths?
- Are they merely analytic?
- Quine's attack on analytic/synthetic distinction
Testimony
Reductionism: Testimony reducible to other sources Anti-Reductionism: Testimony is fundamental source
Conditions: Speaker sincerity, competence, listener's critical uptake
Memory
Preservative: Memory preserves justification Generative: Memory can generate new knowledge Problems: False memories, reliability
Key Concepts
Epistemic Virtues
| Virtue | Description |
|---|---|
| Intellectual humility | Recognizing limits |
| Open-mindedness | Considering alternatives |
| Intellectual courage | Pursuing truth despite cost |
| Thoroughness | Careful investigation |
| Fair-mindedness | Impartial assessment |
Evidence
Evidentialism: Justification proportional to evidence Evidence types: Perceptual, testimonial, inferential
Degrees of Belief (Bayesian)
- Credences: Degrees of belief (0-1)
- Conditionalization: Update on evidence
- Bayes' theorem: P(H|E) = P(E|H)·P(H)/P(E)
Key Vocabulary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Justified | Having good reasons |
| A priori | Independent of experience |
| A posteriori | Dependent on experience |
| Analytic | True by meaning |
| Synthetic | True by world |
| Infallible | Cannot be wrong |
| Defeasible | Can be overridden |
| Propositional knowledge | Knowledge that P |
| Knowledge how | Practical knowledge |
| Epistemic luck | Being right by chance |
| Closure | Knowledge closed under known entailment |
Integration with Repository
Related Themes
thoughts/knowledge/: Epistemological explorationsthoughts/consciousness/: Perception, self-knowledge