TypeScript MCP on Cloudflare Workers

Last Updated: 2025-11-28 Versions: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.23.0, hono@4.10.7, zod@4.1.13

Quick Start

npm install @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@latest hono zod
npm install -D @cloudflare/workers-types wrangler typescript

Basic MCP Server:

import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { z } from 'zod';

const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-mcp-server', version: '1.0.0' });

server.registerTool(
  'echo',
  {
    description: 'Echoes back input',
    inputSchema: z.object({ text: z.string() })
  },
  async ({ text }) => ({ content: [{ type: 'text', text }] })
);

const app = new Hono();

app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
  const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
    sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
    enableJsonResponse: true
  });

  // CRITICAL: Close transport to prevent memory leaks
  c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close());

  await server.connect(transport);
  await transport.handleRequest(c.req.raw, c.res.raw, await c.req.json());
  return c.body(null);
});

export default app; // CRITICAL: Direct export, not { fetch: app.fetch }

Deploy: wrangler deploy

Authentication

API Key (KV-based):

app.use('/mcp', async (c, next) => {
  const apiKey = c.req.header('Authorization')?.replace('Bearer ', '');
  const isValid = await c.env.MCP_API_KEYS.get(`key:${apiKey}`);
  if (!isValid) return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403);
  await next();
});

Cloudflare Zero Trust:

const jwt = c.req.header('Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion');
const payload = await verifyJWT(jwt, c.env.CF_ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN);

Cloudflare Service Tools

D1 Database:

server.registerTool('query-db', {
  inputSchema: z.object({ query: z.string(), params: z.array(z.union([z.string(), z.number()])).optional() })
}, async ({ query, params }, env) => {
  const result = await env.DB.prepare(query).bind(...(params || [])).all();
  return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(result.results) }] };
});

KV, R2, Vectorize: See references/cloudflare-integration.md

Known Issues Prevention

This skill prevents 10+ production issues documented in official MCP SDK and Cloudflare repos:

Issue #1: Export Syntax Issues (CRITICAL)

Error: "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'map')" Source: honojs/hono#3955, honojs/vite-plugins#237 Why It Happens: Incorrect export format with Vite build causes cryptic errors Prevention:

// ❌ WRONG - Causes cryptic build errors
export default { fetch: app.fetch };

// ✅ CORRECT - Direct export
export default app;

Issue #2: Unclosed Transport Connections

Error: Memory leaks, hanging connections Source: Best practice from SDK maintainers Why It Happens: Not closing StreamableHTTPServerTransport on request end Prevention:

app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
  const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport(/*...*/);

  // CRITICAL: Always close on response end
  c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close());

  // ... handle request
});

Issue #3: Tool Schema Validation Failure

Error: ListTools request handler fails to generate inputSchema Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#1028 Why It Happens: Zod schemas not properly converted to JSON Schema Prevention:

// ✅ CORRECT - SDK handles Zod schema conversion automatically
server.registerTool(
  'tool-name',
  {
    inputSchema: z.object({ a: z.number() })
  },
  handler
);

// No need for manual zodToJsonSchema() unless custom validation

Issue #4: Tool Arguments Not Passed to Handler

Error: Handler receives undefined arguments Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#1026 Why It Happens: Schema type mismatch between registration and invocation Prevention:

const schema = z.object({ a: z.number(), b: z.number() });
type Input = z.infer<typeof schema>;

server.registerTool(
  'add',
  { inputSchema: schema },
  async (args: Input) => {
    // args.a and args.b properly typed and passed
    return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: String(args.a + args.b) }] };
  }
);

Issue #5: CORS Misconfiguration

Error: Browser clients can't connect to MCP server Source: Common production issue Why It Happens: Missing CORS headers for HTTP transport Prevention:

import { cors } from 'hono/cors';

app.use('/mcp', cors({
  origin: ['http://localhost:3000', 'https://your-app.com'],
  allowMethods: ['POST', 'OPTIONS'],
  allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization']
}));

Issue #6: Missing Rate Limiting

Error: API abuse, DDoS vulnerability Source: Production security best practice Why It Happens: No rate limiting on MCP endpoints Prevention:

app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
  const ip = c.req.header('CF-Connecting-IP');
  const rateLimitKey = `ratelimit:${ip}`;

  const count = await c.env.CACHE.get(rateLimitKey);
  if (count && parseInt(count) > 100) {
    return c.json({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded' }, 429);
  }

  await c.env.CACHE.put(
    rateLimitKey,
    String((parseInt(count || '0') + 1)),
    { expirationTtl: 60 }
  );

  // Continue...
});

Issue #7: TypeScript Compilation Memory Issues

Error: Out of memory during tsc build Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#985 Why It Happens: Large dependency tree in MCP SDK Prevention:

# Add to package.json scripts
"build": "NODE_OPTIONS='--max-old-space-size=4096' tsc && vite build"

Issue #8: UriTemplate ReDoS Vulnerability

Error: Server hangs on malicious URI patterns Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#965 (Security) Why It Happens: Regex denial-of-service in URI template parsing Prevention: Update to SDK v1.20.2 or later (includes fix)

Issue #9: Authentication Bypass

Error: Unauthenticated access to MCP tools Source: Production security best practice Why It Happens: Missing or improperly implemented authentication Prevention: Always implement authentication for production servers (see Authentication Patterns section)

Issue #10: Environment Variable Leakage

Error: Secrets exposed in error messages or logs Source: Cloudflare Workers security best practice Why It Happens: Environment variables logged or returned in responses Prevention:

// ❌ WRONG - Exposes secrets
console.log('Env:', JSON.stringify(env));

// ✅ CORRECT - Never log env objects
try {
  // ... use env.SECRET_KEY
} catch (error) {
  // Don't include env in error context
  console.error('Operation failed:', error.message);
}

Deployment

# Local
wrangler dev  # http://localhost:8787/mcp

# Production
wrangler deploy

Testing: npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector (connect to http://localhost:8787/mcp)

Templates & References

Templates: basic-mcp-server.ts, tool-server.ts, resource-server.ts, authenticated-server.ts, wrangler.jsonc

References: tool-patterns.md, authentication-guide.md, testing-guide.md, cloudflare-integration.md, common-errors.md

Critical Rules

Always:

• ✅ Close transport on response end (c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close()))
• ✅ Use direct export (export default app, NOT { fetch: app.fetch })
• ✅ Implement authentication for production
• ✅ Update to SDK v1.23.0+ for security fixes

Never:

• ❌ Export with object wrapper
• ❌ Forget to close StreamableHTTPServerTransport
• ❌ Log environment variables or secrets
• ❌ Use outdated SDK versions